When waging wars, the powers that be are driven by strategic preconceptions. In each of the Indo-Pakistani wars, whether 1948, 1965, 1971, 1984 or 1999, both sides had strategic preconceptions. Unfortunately, preconceptions for the aggressor are tortured by two aspects. The first relates to the old saw, “never over-estimate yourself and never under-estimate the enemy”, and the second is the “law of un-intended consequences”. In this essay, we explore these fascinating aspects of the Pakistani military mind.
I wrote these while reading about the 1965 Indo Pakistan War. Needless to say, there is no point in rehashing the details of the actual battles; the winners and losers; the history behind the war and its repercussions; heroes and cowards; the innumerable and frankly pointless loss of life; etc. These aspects were either already thrashed half to death or better military historians than me will be able to shed better light on them. I, therefore, decided to look at the 1965 war as a strong way-point on the path on which the Pakistani strategic mind works, jump forward to 2006, and see what lessons can be drawn. This analysis, coming from a layman, may well be far too airy fairy for many and my apologies for this.
These preconceptions relate to both sides, their own side and the enemy side. This is but natural and deeply rooted in human nature itself. These preconceptions emerge due to very high level factors such as national culture, education systems, national ideology, and extend to mid level factors such as military training, political structure present at that time, quality of the military / economic capabilities, facilities and infrastructure, etc.
In the case of Pakistan, what were and are the preconceptions? The first and foremost is the underestimation of India and its capabilities. Whether it be Indian economics, its people, its military force, its international stature, the quality of its diplomatic corps, the secularity of its body politic, the very strong institutional framework of parliament, judiciary and the executive, the strange but workable (like the proverbial bumblebee) centre-state-regional stresses and strains, all combine to give a completely wrong preconception to the generals, that India is weak and a “strong” shove will make it crumple, shatter into pieces, beaten and defeated. Like General Ayub Khan believed "as a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place."
This is expressed in many ways – such as “the Hindu Bania mentality”, Hindu's were never warriors, Pakistani soldiers are better than Hindu soldiers, Indians are sneaky and underhanded and will never be able to stand up to a forceful reply, their secularism is a sham, the Hindu religion itself does not lend itself to a strong state, so on and so forth. That is on the under-estimation side.
On the over-estimation side, one can see the flip side of the above. A Pakistani soldier is worth three Indian soldiers and other expressions along this ilk. Since the military has ruled over Pakistan (covertly and/or overtly) for most of its history, the predominant view of the strategists is necessarily military focused. Consequently, Pakistan is often seen as an army with a country, unlike India which is a country with an army. Therefore, the feedback mechanism, the strength which comes from a populace which is strongly behind the military, the check on military adventurism, the militarization of society, etc. is different. Hence, the strategists frequently over-estimate their own capabilities.
The second side of the over-estimation comes from the judgment of the military rules as to their worth as a client state to others, whether it be China or USA. Needless to say, that Pakistan acts like a client, but there is a significant difference in expectations between what Pakistan would like to have and what China/USA will let them have. This preconception that their “friends” will step in to help means a significant over-estimation of their own strength when going head to head with the enemy.
The last preconception, which could potentially be the most damaging, is their view of civilians. Because of various well known reasons, the Pakistani military thinks that the civilians are a bunch of nincompoops and blithering idiots, who cannot be relied upon to arrange for the proverbial piss-up in a brewery. Consequently, any and all recommendations which may emanate from the civilian side (foreign ministry, economics ministry, public think tanks, the press, etc) are airily waved away as inconsequential. This leaves the military mind purely focused on the war effort, disregarding the hugely important battles in the international diplomatic arena, the economic arena, the domestic public arena, etc. But it is this lack of respect for anything civilian which also affects their military performance. When there is no accountability to nobody, the military will not live up to its responsibility and will not learn from its mistakes. This chrysalises in the words of Col S. G. Mehdi, MC commanding the SSG until just before the 1965 war: “Had our Government initiated a probe into concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 War', and raised the curtain from the acts of gross omission or that of the criminal commission, the ignominy of 1971 could have been avoided.”
Law of unintended consequences is where these preconceptions come home to roost (if you don’t mind me mangling proverbs). A good planning department will consider various alternatives and have what we call as a decision tree, where each alternative has a series of potential results, with sub decisions, which again have a series of results. Unfortunately if preconceptions are embedded in this process, the range of alternatives will simply not be there. Hence the surprise when the Indians attacked after Operation Gibraltar. Or that the 1965 war will remain a covert war in Kashmir. Or that the Rann of Kutch spat proved that India was a pushover. Or the shock at the lack of support given by US and China to Pakistan’s strong requests for aid.
As I mentioned, being the aggressor means that planning and estimation have to be spot on, after all it is the aggressor, who is trying to change the status quo. Accordingly, (and assuming that victory and the achievement of objectives is the main goal), one has to be prepared for potentially all eventualities. For that, an open mind is necessary, a disciplined validation of basic assumptions is crucial and a balanced estimation of costs/benefits is required. Having preconceptions means that one limits one’s ability at the very start. Consequently, the bravery of the Pakistani soldier or pilots and the sufferings of the civilians are of no avail if the strategists put them into inconclusive or losing battles.
In 2006, having the luxury of looking back, we can but see that the preconceptions, which drove the Pakistani military minds are still there, although (and you can call me an optimist) I see signs of improvement. Not much, but it is happening. The offer for peace talks, the burial of the strategic depth shibboleth, the fact that the Kashmiri militant camps are now an open secret, the fact that the military has seen the need for a “civilian” fig leaf for its rule, the freer press. Ok, ok, so I will not go overboard and all these may wash away with the next general in power. All the above-mentioned mis-conceptions have within them the implicit cure, but before this columns turns into a tome, let me close with a quote, “we judge ourselves by what we THINK we are capable of doing, people judge us by what we have DONE.”
All this to be taken with a grain of salt!
(Note: this was written in 2006, but never published as the outlet went bust.., just found it now)
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