The Kashmir conflict is one of the most stubborn geopolitical challenges in the world, akin to the Israeli–Palestinian crisis. The conflict has antecedents going back sixty years, with roots of the issue planted hundreds of years ago. While it would have been difficult to resolve in 1947, each subsequent political and military step by the various parties has pushed the issue into even more stubborn territory. Though the background to the conflict is public, it is useful to review some key points before we can explore some short and medium term initiatives which can possibly decrease the severity of the conflict if not offer a resolution.
Background to the conflict
It is difficult to generalise the background to the Kashmir conflict because of the bitterness of the fight and the deep divisions among the various parties involved. A cause which may be trivial to a particular party is of importance to another. But most parties agree on the following:
· Kashmir, a Muslim majority state ruled by Hindu kings, contains: Gilgit and Baltistan in the north; a block of land ceded to China in the north-east; Leh and Kargil in the east; Kashmir Valley and Jammu.
· The principle behind the post partition division of geographical units to India or Pakistan was based on the religious majority in geographical areas and will of the state ruler. That said there were princely states where this principle did not hold, such as Junagarh, Hyderabad and of course, Kashmir. A promised plebiscite on the future of the state never took place. India claims the Jammu Kashmir State Parliament voted on this issue, so a plebiscite was needless, while Pakistan does not believe the state parliament vote adheres to the spirit/letter of the original plebiscite. Some Kashmiris say the original plebiscite is wrong, as it only offers accession to India and Pakistan without mention of independence.
· Major ethnic units in Kashmir are Shia and Sunni Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and tiny minorities of other ethnicities (Christians and Sikhs).
· India and Pakistan have fought three wars (1948, 1965, and 1999) over this territory.
· Kashmir was an indirect reason for the 1971 war.
· A militant campaign has been raging in the state since 1989.
· Since 2002, a ceasefire between India and Pakistan has held, although terrorism has not ended. Intermittent talks took place between the three main groups, India, Pakistan and Kashmiri groups with some Confidence Building Measures (CBM) performed.
What do the main stakeholders want?
Given the long history of the conflict, a polarisation and fragmentation of the various groups (with a direct or indirect stake) in the conflict happened. Before we talk about various solutions, it is important to know the direct groups involved:
· Pakistan: Created as a homeland for Muslims, distinct from that of Hindu Majority and Secular India. Kashmir is the last unfinished business of the Partition. Until Kashmir is part of Pakistan, Pakistan’s raison d’être is incomplete. The letter K in Pakistan stands for Kashmir, so attainment of Kashmir is core to the identity and ideology of Pakistan. The Kashmiri cause gives the army reason to grab disproportionate state resources. In addition, because of the religious based foundation of the state, non-state actors, namely the religious parties, are a major and vocal stakeholder in the Kashmir issue.
· India: A strongly democratic secular country, the presence of a Muslim majority state within the ambit of the Indian constitution gives strength to the secular state (both the central government and the local Jammu and Kashmir state government) ideology. The central and state government are not always 100% aligned in their objectives, but both work together. A big security force is present in the state, comprising of regular army troops, paramilitary forces, counter–terrorist forces, state police forces and a myriad of intelligence agencies. The security forces are accused of many human right abuses, but the situation is slowly improving.
· The Kashmiri’s. There are many groups involved and while it is impossible to mention all of them, broadly speaking, we can classify them as follows:
o The militants belong to three groups: the secular independence seeking terrorists (rapidly dwindling in number and influence); the native Kashmiri militants (slowly reducing under diminished Pakistani support and better Indian counter-terror measures) and the foreign militants (usually Pakistani but also from the international jehadi brigades). These militants are not aligned to the Kashmiri political parties and the Pakistani state shows strong yet sporadic control over them.
o The Kashmiri Hindu’s are the largest state minority, despite ethnic cleansing from Kashmir proper since the latest uprising. They are either in refugee camps in India, the Jammu region or have subsumed themselves in India proper. They have little political power and suffer from the flip side of secular India’s objectives (Secular India cannot be seen to provide any major relief to Hindus for fear of being seen as partial to the Hindu majority)
o The Muslims in Kashmir consist of Shia Muslims in Pakistan Kashmir, who resent the pogroms by the hardline Sunni militia and the Sunni Muslims in Indian Kashmir, who criticise Indian rule.
o The Buddhists, a small but significant minority, are mostly present in north-east Kashmir in Laddakh and Leh. Despite their usual non-involvement in the issue, tensions are rising between them and the Muslim population as their sympathies lie with Secular India.
o The Political parties (in Indian Kashmir only, as the political parties in Pakistani Kashmir are not real political parties as we know them, but rather nebulous Pakistani state sponsored groups) include the Indian aligned groups such as the Congress I, National Conference (and variants), People Democratic Party, the secular groupings such as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front and the Pakistani aligned breakaway grouping of the Hurriyat Conference, such as headed by Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Though they have a following within the Valley itself, it is difficult to know their support base, as only the Indian aligned political parties have contested municipal, state and central elections.
o The general populace is, of course, tired of the decade’s long fight and yearns for normality and economic growth. The local state economy is growing (but not as much as it should) after huge central government funding, the India-Pakistan ceasefire and increasingly efficient counter-terror measures.
The external indirect stakeholders are a motley collection of organisations and countries noted for their ineffectual role in resolving this crisis. For example, while the United Nations was present in Kashmir since the first ceasefire in 1948, it is, for all practical purposes useless and ignored by all. Similarly, Pakistan uses the Organisation of Islamic Countries to raise the Kashmir issue regularly and is repeatedly ignored or diplomatically managed away by India. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation cannot resolve bilateral issues.
The United Kingdom retains a role by dint of its colonial history, the presence of large number of Kashmiri origin immigrants and groups in the UK itself and London being one of the world’s diplomatic capitals. America, on the other hand, has kept a low-profile in Kashmir, although it has much more influence and depth inside Pakistan (witness the role of President Clinton during the aftermath of the Kargil War). China is another strange participant. On one hand, it controls Kashmiri territory as well as supports Pakistan’s Army. It has provided funding and materials to build the Karakorum Highway connecting Pakistan with China. While difficult to draw independent conclusions about the influence coefficient of all these organisations and countries, clearly international organisations will simply never be able to play a big role in resolving the Kashmiri issue. The only two countries which have some influence on Pakistan are the USA and China. India, on the other hand, is prickly about its international standing and has not and never will accept any form of public intervention by any other country.
What is the solution?
The BBC (http://tinyurl.com/pys26) has put together a set of pages with various solutions such as Kashmir accedes to Pakistan; Kashmir accedes to India, Kashmir becomes independent and variants of the status quo by adjusting the Line of Control (the 1948 ceasefire line) up and down, etc. The site briefly explains each proposed solution and mentions the challenges and difficulties of each. An interested and independent observer would note that none of the solutions are palatable to all direct stakeholders and the important point is that none of the stakeholders will agree to compromise on the key issues.
In other words, it has become a question of “izzat” (honour) and of a perception of identity and survival to the various parties involved. If India accepts a plebiscite, then it is certain that it will lose and no Indian central government can accept that, in addition, it will violate the secular ideology of India. If Pakistan accepts the LoC as the international border that means denying the core ideology of Pakistan. For the Kashmiri jehadi’s to accept political control by India over Kashmir (in any form) is to violate their religious precepts. Given the identification of the other competing stakeholders as the enemy, any compromise is simply not possible. Once you factor in the degree of militancy and the possibility of murders of leaders who dare even suggest a compromise, talk of a solution is plainly impossible as compromise is labelled as selling out to the enemy and leading to the extinction of national/group identity.
A political solution involving territory between two parties is usually only reached after a war, where one party is defeated and thus has to accept the solution, or else, a third-party or parties force/mediate between the two to accept some territorial swaps. Kashmir, as we have seen, does not have a defeated party and no external party has enough leverage to force neither Pakistan nor India into a political solution. Once we include existential reasons such as national survival/identity, religious or secular ideologies, the chances of a lasting political solution are near zero if not negative. Negative in the sense there is a strong chance the current peace process (if the desultory talks and halting steps can be considered as such) can get derailed after some dramatic terrorist attack on a high-profile target or a serious and public human rights violation.
Pushing for a solution now will be useless due to deeply entrenched political positions based on maximalist objectives of all the parties involved. A solution has to be a win-win one, but because of this maximalist perspective, no party is willing to give up any positions/points for the greater good. In other words, everybody is out to get all they can get and damn the rest. None of the solutions will be acceptable because of the intransigence of all the parties involved in the current climate.
If no solutions are acceptable, then what?
One looks at the entrenched positions, the history of the conflict and simply fails to think of a good, reasonable solution acceptable to all concerned. For sake of brevity, one can lessen the challenge to trying to reconcile three mutually incompatible objectives, wish for independence by the Kashmiris, wish to keep Kashmir within India for secular reasons and wish to get Kashmir for Pakistan for religious reasons. Given a limited territorial space and incompatibility of the objectives, there can be no solution. But if no solutions are acceptable to all parties right now, that does not mean there can be no mutually acceptable solutions in the future. So the ground rules have to change.
How can we change ground rules?
When a state gets subsumed into a supranational state, then territorial conflicts change character and become more diffuse, examples such as Northern Ireland, Scotland and Cyprus within supranational European State spring to mind. These conflicts have lost much potency once the idea of states fighting over territory got included into the overarching European identity. They have not been resolved, but the maximalist positions became much less. Another example is to convert hard, fenced, land mined borders into soft ones. When men, material, money and machines can move freely over borders, then hard nationalistic or identity politics lose much of their edge. There is, of course, the violent alternative of having an all-out war, where one party defeats the other and essentially removes it from the equation, but no sane person would agree to the last alternative. Irrespective of which option is selected, the objective remains the same, namely to try moving people and parties away from their entrenched positions into fertile soil to allow a solution to emerge in time.
This means that instead of just aiming for a final solution, slow interim steps should be taken to change the ground rules. Of course, for communication and public appetite, a constant reassuring stream of high-quality messages must be transmitted by all senior leaders. Some of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that can be launched:
1. Economic measures: A Free trade agreement between India and Pakistan would be valuable. Special attention can be given to Kashmir, so Kashmiri made products can be given tax exceptions, for purchase and sale in both India and Pakistan as well as for export. Tourism also provides great optimism, as Indians going to Kashmir for tourism can be allowed access to say the northern areas for extending their stay. Subsidies and tax exemptions can be given to foreign investors.
2. Social measures: Allowing greater movement of citizens across the border will be worthwhile. The bus, truck and train CBMs notwithstanding, greater openness is suggested. Security can be a concern, but the movement (not only for Kashmiris) has to be intensified. In addition, cross regional marriages should be encouraged, educational opportunities – such as reserved seats, scholarships, etc. opened to people from both sides of the border.
3. Cultural measures: Exchange of music, drama, film and other mediums should be strongly encouraged to highlight the overarching theme of a common identity and Kashmiriat..
4. Politics and Governance: Political parties should be governed under a code of conduct which stresses peaceful resolution of issues, renounces violence, etc. On both sides of the border, true local governance has to be set up. For example, on the Indian side, other than the border areas, all security forces should be brought under local political control. On the Pakistani side, a true local Kashmiri polity should be allowed to develop rather than being led from Islamabad.
5. Law & Order: The judiciary on both sides should be strengthened. An independent body will review reported human rights crimes by all parties (security forces and militants). An independent Kashmir wide Human Rights Council (with possible observer status to Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International etc.) granted powers and wide participation from both sides of the border.
6. The media: The media must play a big role, and open transparency is essential. Allowing private channels in radio, TV and internet will help to provide a diversity of opinions. Internet and mobile communications to be increased in penetration and improved.
7. International Relations between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan can take many steps on the diplomatic side to allow commonalities to rule rather than differences to divide. Such as a public announcement that both India and Pakistan’s WTO working groups will work together. Or announce that India and Pakistan will work on commonalities such as a joint UN peacekeeping force (perhaps not peace enforcement initially); technical aid to poor countries; law of the sea, environmental issues and the Kyoto treaty; water management; etc.
What are the risks and how to mitigate them?
As mentioned earlier, even these small interim ground rule changing steps can be threatened by many events. There are three major possible events (with a reasonably high probability of happening over the next 3-5 years) which can seriously put the peace process into reverse.
1. A big terrorist strike in Kashmir or India
As noted before, the militant groups in Pakistan are not under the full control of the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. In other words, for this peace process to work, the militants have to be reined in to allow social and economic life to begin. This is not easy as the jehadi toothpaste, once squeezed out, is difficult to return into the tube. While not impossible, the Pakistani Army will have to increase the pressure on these militant groups to reduce their activities. It is, of course, impossible to imagine the groups can be made to disband; dialing down their activities will allow the CBMs to launch and take root.
2. A big human rights issue emerges in India because of the security forces
While the Indian armed forces are improving their control over human right abuses, there is indeed a chance that a serious incident might happen which can seriously risk the CBMs. The militants could take up arms again, rebelling against the Pakistani Army authority, and ordinary folks turn off the entire peace process. The current human rights management process within the Indian security forces has to be strengthened and made transparent to the public.
3. Change of government in India
Although both the BJP and the Congress led coalitions are committed to the peace process and are determined to find a solution, it is not inconceivable that a hardline government takes power after the current one. This new government may roll back the peace process, halt it or even embark on a full war, especially if a big terrorist strike happens (or for example, a high-profile political leader is assassinated). While mitigating actions against such an eventuality are difficult to note, the best defence against it is to let a thousand CBMs flower. More CBMs will lessen the chance of all of them being rolled back. Also, the more of India is involved (by greater tourism, economic links, educational links, etc.), the more difficult it would be for the hardline government to roll back the process.
4. Change of government in Pakistan
While currently General Musharraf is in charge of the Pakistani Army, there is a possibility of an internal army revolt/coup where a hard-line officer takes over. Or there is a national movement by the Pakistani religious parties which forces the army to hand-over power to the civilians as has happened before. In either case, the peace process can be rolled back and the jehadi reins loosened. Given the democratic deficit and tradition of autocratic rule in Pakistan, even an increase in the number of CBMs is no defence against all of them being stopped. The only possible mitigation is American pressure and for this, USA can be asked to be a discreet and unofficial guarantor of these CBMs.
Conclusion
It will take political will, persistence and mainly dedication to seek a true peace and stability across all sections of the stakeholders. It will require patience and understanding to deal with mistakes and mistakes will be made. Given the current leadership of Pakistan and India, there is hope that by carrying out some or all of these CBMs, the first faltering steps towards resolving the horrendous Kashmir Conflict can be taken.
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The Kashmir Conflict is largely influenced by the west as well. Relations between Washington and New Delhi have run hot and cold over the decades. When America pursued Pakistan as an ally to contain communist aggression in the 1950s, India viewed US economic and military aid to its enemy as hostile towards its own interests. However, when the US supported India in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, Pakistan was offended and pursued friendly relations with the Chinese. But, as Indian political and economic affinities more closely matched those of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, US-Indian relations cooled. They grew cold again in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Nixon administration cozied up to Islamabad making use of Pakistan’s relationship with China to improve US-Chinese relations. Nixon’s support for Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan War further alienated Washington from New Delhi. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the US sent billions in aid to Pakistan, India’s resentment toward the US grew ever more determined (Yasmeen, 2006).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India traded its socialist economic system and its “Soviet-leaning foreign and security policies for a market economy and U.S.-leaning foreign relations.” This transition has attracted many American investors, but left Russia mainly out of the loop (Thomas, 2004:203). US-Indian relations improved dramatically in the 1990s, when Washington discontinued its support to Islamabad. When both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the Clinton administration attempted to mediate between them. But Pakistan’s hostile entrance into Kargil tipped the scales in favor of stronger US-Indo relations at the expense of US relations with Pakistan. However, the 9/11 attacks made Pakistan a valuable ally to the Bush administration, and America again began funneling economic and military aid into Pakistan, much to India’s disliking. The 2002 crises between India and Pakistan saw America, once again, playing the role of mediator, but with no obvious favorite as with the Clinton administration (Yasmeen, 2006). America’s main objectives in India today are to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region, discourage an India-Pakistani nuclear war, and deny safe havens for terrorist organizations:
India’s relations with America are vastly better than during the Cold War, but that country’s own development of nuclear weapons in the 1990s meant that Washington recently had to press New Delhi hard to secure its opposition to Iran’s nuclear program (Own, 2006:38).
India’s emergence as a nuclear power can be tied to the peaceful nuclear technology that was exchanged freely during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1953, Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program promised to share atomic energy with the world. And in 1957, the US established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organization responsible for monitoring energy facilities in recipient countries. In the 1950s, Canada sold two 220 megawatt heavy-water reactors to India. These were followed by two 150-megawatt light-water reactors that the United States gave India in 1961. Since then, India has built several more nuclear reactors. And while India agreed to place the Canadian and American reactors under IAEA safeguards, none of the Indian reactors were placed under inspection. India tested its first atomic device in 1974 and in 1978 the United States enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA). The NNPA discontinued American cooperation with peaceful nuclear programs in countries that refused IAEA inspections, such as India. Despite sanctions by the United States, India obtained enriched uranium from France and Germany. Yet while the viability of nuclear energy has made a startling recovery since the early days of the IAEA, in 2000 only 2.5 percent of all electricity generated in India was derived from nuclear power. This was no doubt at least partially due to US sanctions. Especially for Indian cities such as Madras and Bombay, with no major rivers nearby for hydroelectric power, nuclear energy is a vital option for the 21st century. But it comes with substantial risks of further proliferation (Thomas, 2004).
India’s reaction to the Bush Doctrine has been mixed. On the one hand, America’s policy of preemption is favored by those in India that would like to preemptively strike strategic targets in Kashmir and Pakistan. After all, the Bush Doctrine condemns terrorists and those who harbor them. Many in India would argue that this should apply to Pakistan, as it has created terrorist groups such as Jaish Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, and it provides sanctuary to terrorist groups as well. But, the hypocrisy in the Bush Doctrine is easily seen. While America reserves the right to preemptively strike other nations without UN authority on the bases that they harbor terrorists, have WMD or pose a threat to the US, it will not label its ally (Pakistan) as a terrorist state; nor would it stand by and allow India to launch preemptive strikes against Pakistani targets. Hence, even many of those in India that favor a policy of preemption, are not in favor of Bush’s policy of unilateralism. Still others in India argue that a policy of preemption is not favorable to the current policy of deterrence at all, regardless of what America would allow. They argue that preemptive strikes against Pakistan will only incite retaliatory strikes by Pakistan. Despite these opposing views, India’s substantial and lucrative trade with the US, combined with its interest in improving relations with Washington, has led New Delhi to a policy of not openly criticizing the Bush Doctrine, while distancing itself from the US policy of unilateralism (Yasmeen, 2006).
However, Mohan Malik (2004:35-6) suggests that India “has now appropriated the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption.” He cites the strong presence of pro-Taliban Islamic parties in Pakistan’s October 2002 parliamentary elections, Pakistan’s weak efforts to counter al-Qaeda, Pakistan’s seedy dealings with North Korea via A.Q. Khan, and perhaps most importantly, India’s frustration over the Bush administration’s two-faced support of the Musharraf regime and its lip service to India. Malik also points out that since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war; China has “made heavy strategic and economic investments in Pakistan.” This has also placed India under considerable pressure. In fact, Malik argues that without Chinese nuclear and missile shields in the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan would have never engaged in conflict with India over Kashmir. And even though China has attempted to cozy up to India in the past decades, it has continued its military aid to Pakistan.
The Pakistan-India Nuclear Crisis also demonstrated to India the true nature of its strategic situation. Between December 2001 and August 2002, Musharraf made three trips to Beijing, and received “firm assurances of support in the event of a war” between Pakistan and India. While China made it clear that it preferred Pakistan not initiate a war, it fully promised that “Beijing will firmly stand on the side of Islamabad” if war did break out. China also succeeded in obtaining Russia’s cooperation in issuing a “Joint Declaration on the India-Pakistan Situation,” leaving India with little hope of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council if India and Pakistan went to war. War nearly came after a terrorist attack on a military base in Jammu on May 14, 2002 in which 34 were killed, a majority of which were women and children. While China mediated for peace between the two nuclear states, it strongly criticized the Bush administration for going ahead with a joint military maneuver with India May 16-25, 2002. Reports in the media (based on intelligence leaks) revealed that the Pakistani Army deployed tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or “baby nukes” to the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. These are rumored to have come from China, as it is the only country besides the US and Russia to possess a stockpile of them. TNWs offer Pakistan the opportunity to destroy everything within a one-mile radius. The big question is, if India did not also possess baby nukes at the time of such an engagement, would they retaliate with a massive nuclear attack? Perhaps an even bigger question: with China’s support of Pakistan, the US supporting both Pakistan and India, and China’s mistrust of the Bush administration’s interest in the region; will the Pakistan-India situation eventually turn into a proxy war between the US and China? (Malik, 2004:38, 41).
Some critics argue that the recent 123 Agreement is a potential step in that direction. India’s coalition government is strongly divided over the deal in which India gets civilian nuclear technology and fuel in exchange for placing its civilian nuclear program within international safeguards. While the 123 Agreement says nothing of India’s nuclear weapons program, it does require under the Hyde Act, that India’s foreign policy line up with US foreign policy, and that Washington certifies this on an ongoing annual basis. Those on India’s political left are opposed to the agreement, and call for an end to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) talks intended to finalize the deal. The left is arguing that India’s sovereignty is the issue, and calling to mind the way the US pressured India into voting against Iran at the IAEA meeting in 2006. Despite pressure from the left, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is committed to going ahead with the deal (Singh, 2007).
Chuck Hagel (2006:16) describes the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal as “one of the most thoughtful approaches to foreign policy in the last 25 years.” The republican Senator from Nebraska offers a frank and realistic summation of both the region and the relevant issues:
You have four nuclear powers: Russia, China, India and Pakistan, and a fifth aspirant, Iran. The Pakistan-Afghan border is the focal point for a good deal of terrorist-extremist activity; the Taliban has been reasserting itself and has re-emerged in that area. There are tremendous fault lines-cultural, historical, tribal and religious-which run throughout the region. One does not have to look much further than the question of Jammu and Kashmir and how it divides Pakistan and India.
Senator Hagel’s explanation as to why the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal is good for the entire region is centered on the “need for energy,” which he identifies as “the driving force that brings all countries and societies together.” Hagel reasons that as India’s population is projected to surpass China’s in the next 25 years, its economy is going to need “a secure supply of energy.” Furthermore, Hagel, posits that as the two largest democracies in the world, the U.S. and India have common interests. This may well be, but it doesn’t necessarily allay the fears and suspicions of other state actors in the region, particularly Pakistan and China, to which the Senator assures that America’s nuclear agreement with India “is in no way intended to threaten the U.S. relationship with Pakistan or any other state” (Hagel, 2006:16-7). As thin as that assurance may sound to some, Hagel does advocate a solid approach toward Iran: talk to them. He makes it clear that he disagrees with the Bush administration’s standoffish approach to engagement with Iran over any issue other than Iraq. He also suggests that the Bush administration is expecting too much from Musharraf. Hagel praises the realism of the Reagan administration:
Foreign policy must be grounded in our values, what we believe, what has formed and shaped us as a nation. You work outward from that. But you must have a very clear understanding of the reality of the world as it is-and the dynamics of that reality-before you can frame and successfully implement policy. (Hagel, 2006:19).
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