USA has a disproportionate influence on Pakistan. For good or for bad, be that as it may, but for most of the poor country's history over the past 60 odd years, USA has used, abused, loved and hated Pakistan. Sometimes it was clear about its aims, sometimes very cynical and sometimes it was good-hearted. Needless to say, the relationship can be characterised as a weird (part abusive, part loving, and part neglect) father and teenage son relationship. In this decade, the level of attention has dramatically gone up, due to the American War on Terror. Drawing long term Pakistani policy options for Americans is useless, as the American span of attention is a maximum of 4 years or just solving an immediate problem, which ever is shorter. Consequently, for people in the UK and India who want to understand American policy towards Pakistan it is short term in nature. That said, Pakistan watchers in the UK and India rely on three distinct strands (ranked by the amount of information), the first are the reported actions by the USA, Pakistan and other assorted parties, second are the think tank and analyst (such as the RAND Corp, CIA, Foreign Policy, and independent scholar etc ruminations and the third are the rare insights by senior military and diplomatic personnel.
2004 has been an interesting year for Pakistan as we all know and I don’t need to re-hash it all. But looking at the above three strands, there has been quite a lot of movement, insofar as the publication of Stephen Cohen's book, ‘The Idea of Pakistan’, Strobe Talbott's book ‘Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb’, the Rand Corporations report on contributions by India and Pakistan on the war on terror and so on and so forth. In particular, I strongly recommend Stephen Cohen's book as an excellent primer on Pakistan. In particular, the good analysis of the history of Pakistan, the Pakistani Army, Islamic groups, its socio-economic-political structure, international relations and its potential medium term future are excellent. As he describes Pakistan, it’s a country which negotiates by pointing a gun (more like a nuclear missile) at its own head. Help us otherwise we will take the world down with it. I do not plan to reiterate or go over Cohen's book in detail. For readers interested in more information on this book, Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy has written a excellent book review which was published by the prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine and can be accessed here:
(http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101fareviewessay83611/pervez-hoodbhoy/can-pakistan-work-a-country-in-search-of-itself.html).
Once I finished reading the book, I was interested to see how the 3 above mentioned strands line up. If Strobe Talbott is an example of how the state department works in this day and age and if Stephen Cohen and the Rand Corporation's publications show the strategic thinking in USA which feeds into the USA military – politico complex, what lessons can the policy makers in United Kingdom and India draw from the information which we have gathered in 2004? If we take Cohen's book as a benchmark (well, we have to start somewhere), there are several points in there which need to be explored in detail from the perspectives of the UK and India. This is what we will do in some of the succeeding columns.
One may well ask, what gives the USA, UK and India the right to do anything about Pakistan? A very good question and something which needs to be answered before we start off. As someone said in the Pakistani Press recently, Pakistan is considered to be the sick man of Asia, echoing what was said a century ago for Turkey. Combine that with Islamic fundamentalism, nuclear power, no civil institutions to speak of, in a sensitive geopolitical situation and run by the military, the powers need to be careful about it. USA is, for obvious reasons, very concerned as it is the target of the full might of Islamic Fundamentalism. India because it has a running sore in Kashmir which is picked at by Pakistan and has to live with this sick man next door (contagious?) and finally UK because of its colonial history and the significant number of Pakistani and Indian extraction minorities in the UK. Not to mention that the level of British human and military intelligence is of a far higher level and expertise than the Americans, so they can actually provide better information. The UK is also very closely tied with the USA and for better or for worse, is closely associated with American policies and will have to bear the brunt of any blow-backs.
The main points which we will be discussing anon will be around the following:
• There is a small chance that Pakistan may break apart. What will be the repercussions for the UK and India and what, if anything, can these two countries do about it (or indeed, should they?)
• The difficulty that Pakistan has in defining its "national interest" although this term is thrown around with gay abandon. Why is this important and what really could be the national interest of Pakistan?
• Closely tied to the above is why Pakistan was created and the repercussions at this current state?
• Why does Pakistan find it so difficult to reconcile the concept of Pakistan with democracy? In particular, a constitution and regular elections are key (bearing in mind that they are not the only ones) requirements for a liberal democratic country
• As they say, Pakistan is ruled by the Army and the officers of the Army are all graduates from the Pakistan Military Academy while France is ruled by the ‘élite Ecole’ graduates. These 2 sets of institutions, for good or for bad, by and large, define what their countries will be. What are the implications of this?
• The Pakistani army has been inculcated with an idea that there is something called as an Islamic Strategy of warfare. In particular, the concept of "terror" is considered to be a cornerstone of this way of warfare. What are the implications of this angle?
• The Pakistani Army and indeed many militant and terrorist groups use Jihad as a leitmotif and ideology. The western equivalent of Jihad is the Just War concept. What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the two?
• Pakistan has had many successful and unsuccessful coups in its short but torrid history. What were the reasons behind these coups? Will these reasons continue, thereby requiring more coups in the future? Will the National Security Council help in removing the need for coups?
• The British Indian Army had a history of 200 years and more before the partition in 1947 and was divided into the Indian Army and Pakistani Army after. Why did the Indian army not take the same steps and actions as the Pakistani Army, while the cultures, history, religions, nationhood, languages, food, etc. were, to a very large degree, common?
• Why does Stephen Cohen say that many officers in the Pakistani Army have strategic tunnel vision? What can be done to widen this tunnel?
• Maulana Mawdudi was one of the most influential of Pakistan's Islamists. His influence has been wide-spread besides in Pakistan, from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to the Afghan Taliban to the Indian Muslim Organisation to the organisations in South East Asia. It is said that the influence of a teacher stops at eternity. What did he teach and how did he influence and what is the impact?
• Certain sections of the Pakistani Islamists definitely believe in violence to achieve their goals, witness their actions in Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan. As long as their goals are congruent with the Pakistan Army's objectives and desires (such as achieving strategic depth in Afghanistan, bleeding India, etc. etc), these violent groups can always shelter under the Army's umbrella. What can be done to address this? Divorce the shared congruency?
• When President Bush, in his seminal address, labelled North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the Axis of Evil, many were surprised that Pakistan wasn’t included. What are the requirements to be on this axis? Why was Pakistan not included? What would have happened if it had been included? • Pakistan has been often compared to Israel, of all places. There is prima facie evidence that there are significant similarities between the two countries. In Israel, the soldier can become a politician and the army is firmly under civilian political control. Can this model be applied in Pakistan? How?
• Cohen also compares Pakistan with Egypt in the way that the state has spectacularly failed to satisfy the needs of its citizens but it can be propped up almost indefinitely by others. Shades of negotiating with a gun pointed at one's own head, but for how long?
• In 2003, President Bush laid out 3 goals of American policy towards Pakistan. (1) partnering on the war of terror, (2) nuclear non-proliferation and (3) democratisation. Are these goals achievable by 2008 when President Bush retires?
• Education has been rightly noted as the key to nip terror in the bud. Ideals and objectives are the easy bit, but what about the implementation? We take a clear hard look at the challenges and potential solutions for calibrating educational systems which are the breeding grounds.
• Can the USA and/or the UK help in bringing about India Pakistan peace? If USA offers a security umbrella to both countries, would that help?
In particular, I would like to draw some conclusions for UK and India along the lines of what Stephen Cohen has drawn for the USA. As we have already mentioned, the United Kingdom as a medium power has no direct issue with Pakistan but has many an indirect connections. The colonial history aside, there are a very large number of Pakistani and Bangladeshi extraction nationals, plus there is the Islam factor. In addition, UK has to live up to its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council, a leading light in Europe and a source/destination of terrorism. A failed or failing or troubled Pakistan will definitely have a major impact in the UK and on British Politics.
On the other hand, India has a far more and direct stake in Pakistan becoming a prosperous and stable liberal democracy, albeit it has a far greater limitations around territorial integrity, Hindu-Muslim issues, the history of partition, etc. etc. A failed or failing Pakistan will cause severe damage, far more and above what it has ever done. It is in India's interest to calibrate its foreign, economic and military policy and make sure Pakistan does not or can not harm at the minimum and ideally becomes a full partner. For those who say, let it rot, I can only point out that India has far more to lose than Pakistan. We simply cannot raise a fence and wall Pakistan off, not in this day and age. Fences don’t work, I am afraid.
All this to be taken with a grain of salt!


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